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Protecting the Home:
Castle Doctrine in North Carolina
ABSTRACT

The idea that a person's home is her castle dates back to at least the
seventeenth century in England. This idea can be seen today in a plethora
of places throughout American Law, including Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Partof North Carolina'sself-defense law has been deemed
a "castle doctrine, "yet courts have applied itsprotections inconsistently at
best. As it now stands, the North Carolinacastle doctrine does not truly
afford a homeowner the ability to defend her home from an unlawful
intruder. A potential criminal prosecution is the last thing that a
homeowner should have to worry about when defending her home from an
invasion. This Comment explores the history of the castle doctrine in
general, in North Carolina, and in Florida,and offers solutions in the form
of amendments to North Carolina General Statutes sections 14-51.2 and

14-51.3.
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INTRODUCTION

Jason Clary, a convicted felon, stepped into his front yard with a loaded
muzzleloader rifle and faced two male intruders.1 The intruders, armed with
metal pipes, yelled and cursed at Clary while they advanced toward him and
his girlfriend.2 After retorting with curses of his own, Clary warned the men
to retreat from his property or face consequences. 3 One of the men refused
Clary's warning and instead advanced further.4 As promised, Clary aimed
his rifle and fired, striking the intruder in the abdomen.5 The wounded
intruder died on the way to the hospital. 6 Clary was subsequently arrested
and charged with first degree murder.7
Clary filed a motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to the affirmative
defense of the home under North Carolina General Statutes sections 14-51.2
and 14-51.3, collectively known as the "castle doctrine," 8 and moved for a
pretrial immunity hearing;9 both motions were denied. 10 At trial, Clary,
through his counsel, again asserted the castle doctrine defense." Clary
wanted an instruction slightly different than the pattern jury instruction
found in North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction-Criminal 308.80, which
he felt better explained when the castle doctrine defense applied." The

1. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NCGS 15A-954(a)(9) and NCGS 14-51.2, State v.
Clary, No. 16-CRS-50484 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 1, Clary, No. 16-CRS-50484 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Sept. 6, 2018); Dave Faherty, Alexander Co. homeowner claims self-defense in deadly

shooting, WSOCTV (May 3, 2016, 11:32 AM), https://www.wsoctv.com/news/local/
deputies-say-homeowner-shot-man-in-yard-near-taylorsville/209457942/ [https://perma.cc/
Q3KQ-NQBX].
8. See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 2; N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-51.2 to -51.3 (2019).
9. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1; Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, supranote

7, at 1-2.
10. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 1-2.

11. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-51.2 to -51.3; Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1.
12. N.C.P.I.-CRM. 308.80 (2012) ("In addition, (absent evidence to the contrary), the
lawful occupant of a [home] ... is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent
death or serious bodily harm to [himself] ...

when using defensive force . . . if both of the

following apply: (1) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a

[home] . . . and (2) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that
an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.").
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judge rejected Clary's modifications and instructed that Clary would only
be justified in using self-defense if he "reasonably believed that the intruder
would kill or inflict serious bodily harm" to him or others with him. 13 The
judge also qualified the justification by stating, "It is for you, the jury, to
determine the reasonableness of the defendant's belief from the
circumstances as they appeared to the defendant at the time."14 Although
the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, this case from Alexander County
Superior Court provides a recent example of the struggles North Carolina
judges have faced when trying to apply the state's castle doctrine. To avoid
future issues, the North Carolina General Assembly should amend the
statutes encompassing the castle doctrine, using Florida's statute as
guidance, and implement a pretrial immunity hearing.
The arguments this Comment makes, in short, are as follows: First, the
traditional understanding of the castle doctrine, garnered from English
common law, is that a person has a right to defend himself within his home
when there is an unlawful attack upon it.' 5 Second, the variation among
United States jurisdictions in applying such a doctrine to general
understandings of self-defense has created many versions of this doctrine
that do not truly reflect its traditional understanding.' 6 Third, North
Carolina has taken some encouraging steps to strengthen the doctrine's
effect, but its application in practice has been inconsistent at best.' 7 Finally,
Florida's provisions, sections 776.013 and 776.032, are very similar to

Clary asserted that the presumption should be rebuttable only by negating elements (1) and
(2), not by evidence tending to show absence of reasonable fear, but the judge declined to
provide an instruction to such effect. In other words, Clary wanted the "absent evidence to
the contrary" language from the pattern jury instruction to only apply to evidence negating
elements (1) and (2) listed above, and not apply to evidence seeking to establish that Clary
did not fear death or serious bodily harm. See Defense of Home, Clary, No. 16-CRS-50484

(N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2019); Instructions at 9, Clary, No. 16-CRS-50484 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2019).
13. See Instructions, supra note 12, at 9.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreatfrom a MurderousAssault, 16 HARv. L. REv. 567, 574-

75 (1903).
16. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 888 n.32 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing widespread jurisdictional variation on how different
states implement the right to self-defense as a defense to criminal prosecution).
17. See generally John Rubin, Defensive Force in the Home, UNmv. N.C. ScH. Gov'T:

N.C.: CRIM. L. (Aug. 7, 2018, 9:11 AM), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/defensive-forcein-the-home/ [https://perma.cc/4T76-8J8M].
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North Carolina's laws, yet seem to afford defendants a more clear-cut way
to receive the justification.' 8
Section I of this Comment analyzes the historical understanding of the
castle doctrine with an emphasis on early English case law. It also analyzes
the difficulties in applying the doctrine throughout the United States to
demonstrate that North Carolina's problems are not unique. Section II
provides a comparative analysis of the North Carolina statute before 2011contained in the now-repealed section 14-51.1 of the North Carolina
General Statutes-and the current statutes, sections 14-51.2 and 14-51.3,
including their strengths and shortcomings. Section III contrasts North
Carolina's statutes with Florida's and shows how, even with the 2011
amendments, North Carolina law does not align with the historical
understanding of the doctrine. This section closely examines how the
language of the statutes does not adequately protect defendants seeking to
argue defense of the home in homicide cases. Section IV proposes changes
in the law that will simplify its application in the real world and properly
protect the people who defend their homes against harmful intrusions.
I. THE CASTLE DOCTRINE'S ROOTS
A. English Defense of Habitation
Society has long valued a person's right to defend himself or herself
from intruders in his or her home. At common law, a person generally had
a duty to retreat from potentially harmful situations before engaging in
self-defense. 19 However, common law also combined defense of habitation
and self-defense to create an exception to this general duty to retreat. 20
English law considered a person's home to be his "castle" and allowed one
to defend his home against felonious harm without retreating. 2 1 When
defending one's home from felonious harm, the use of self-defense was
"justifiable," meaning that no pardon was necessary for the person to be
acquitted of murder. 22 This exception to the general "flee to the wall" rule
was notable because English law did not excuse parties who killed in mutual

18. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-51.2 to -51.3 (2019), with FLA. STAT. §§ 776.013,
.032 (2015 & Supp. 2020).
19. See Beale, supra note 15, at 575-76.
20. Benjamin Levin, A Defensible Defense: Reexamining Castle Doctrine Statutes, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 530 (2010).
21. Beale, supra note 15, at 574-75.

22. Id. at 573-74.
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combat, even if the killing party was acting in self-defense.23 Instead, the
only way the party could avoid criminal punishment-usually death-was
to receive a pardon.24 Defense of habitation, however, was elevated above
5
even these "excusable" killings, since no pardon was required to acquit.
One of the first cases to recognize the castle doctrine at common law
was Semayne's Case.26 There, an English court laid out the traditional
understanding of the castle doctrine as explicitly allowing a citizen whose
castle was under siege to commit a deadly attack on an intruder without
incurring criminal liability. 27 The English court wrote:
[T]he house of every one is to him as his ... castle and fortress, as well for
his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose; . . . [and] if thieves
come to a man's . . . house to rob him, or murder, and the owner of his
servants kill any of the thieves in defence of himself and his house, it is not
felony, and he shall lose nothing ... .28

Thus, the traditional common law view of the castle doctrine required
only two things for a killing to be justified: (1) the intruder broke into the
defendant's house with the intent to commit a felony therein, and (2) the
defendant knew or had reason to believe that the unlawful intrusion was
occurring or had occurred. 29
B. Defense of Habitation in the United States
Although the United States adopted much of the English common law,
the general idea of defense of habitation to stop an intruder within the home
has not always aligned with the traditional English understanding as
The United States Supreme Court most recently
discussed above.
doctrine in 1998,30 but one of its earliest explanations
the
castle
referenced
of the doctrine of self-defense was espoused by the Court over 100 years
earlier. In Beard v. United States, Beard was convicted by a jury of
31
manslaughter after killing Will Jones over a dispute regarding a cow.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 575.
See id. at 574-75.
Id.
Semayne's Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 194; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 a.
Id.
Id. at 195, 5 Co. Rep. at 91b.
Id. at 194-95, 5 Co. Rep. at 91 a-91 b.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 552 (1895) ("In the afternoon of the day on

which the Jones brothers were warned by Beard not again to come upon his premises for the
cow unless attended by an officer of the law . .. they again went to his farm, in his absence-
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Beard was on his own property when he struck Jones in the head with a
pistol. 32 Jones was in the process of drawing a weapon, intending to
unlawfully take Beard's cow. 33 The trial court instructed the jury as
follows:
If these boys ... went down there, and they were there unlawfully ... you
naturally inquire whether the defendant was placed in such a situation as
that he could kill for that reason. Of course, he could not. He could not kill
them because they were upon his place. ... And if these young men were
there in the act of attempting the larceny of this cow and calf and the
defendant killed because of that .. . that is manslaughter; that is all it is;
there is nothing else in it; that is considered so far provocative as that it
reduces the grade of the crime to manslaughter and no farther. If they had
no intent to commit a larceny; if it was a bare, naked trespass; if they were
there under a claim of right to get this cow ... and Will Jones was killed by
the defendant for that reason, that would be murder, because you cannot kill
a man for bare trespass-you cannot take his life for a bare trespass-and
say the act is mitigated.34

When reviewing the trial court's instruction, the Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Harlan, stated only the general principle of
self-defense, which requires a reasonable and subjective fear of death or
serious bodily harm before a defendant could respond with deadly force. 35
In doing so, the Court quoted Bishop's Criminal Law, 36 a leading treatise at
the time, but did not mention the castle doctrine. 37
Whether Justice Harlan intended to omit the castle doctrine is
unknown, but this opinion highlights the struggles that even the Supreme
Court experiences in differentiating between when reasonable fear of
imminent death or serious bodily harm is requiredto be shown at trial for a
person to be justified in using deadly force versus when reasonable fear is
presumed.38
In Minnesota v. Carter, written over one hundred years later, Justice
Scalia stated the traditional understanding of the doctrine when he gave

one of them, the deceased, being armed with a concealed deadly weapon-and attempted to
take the cow away, but were prevented from doing so .... ").

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 552-53.
Id.
Id. at 554-55.
See id. Additional instructions were given. Id. at 554-58. For the purposes of this

Comment, the instructions above provide enough background information.
36. See generally Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop's Orthodoxy, 13 L. & HiST. REv. 215,

215 (1995) (discussing Bishop's contributions as a legal scholar).
37. Beard, 158 U.S. at 559-62.
38. See id. at 557.
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homage to Blackstone's treatise by writing, "[E]very man's house is looked
upon by the law to be his castle ... [and] it is the defendant's own dwelling
which by law is said to be his castle." 39 But like in Semayne's Case, the
Court in Carter was not facing a self-defense claim when discussing the
doctrine. 40
In the well-known case of McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice
Stevens pointed out the widespread variation among jurisdictions in the
United States in implementing the right of self-defense in the home:
All 50 States already recognize self-defense as a defense to criminal
prosecution . . . so this is hardly an interest to which the democratic process
has been insensitive. And the States have always diverged on how exactly
to implement this interest, so there is wide variety across the Nation in the
types and amounts of force that may be used, the necessity of retreat, the
rights of aggressors, the availability of the 'castle doctrine,' and so
forth.... Such variation is presumed to be a healthy part of our federalist
system, as the States and localities select different rules in light of different
4
priorities, customs, and conditions. 1

Still, it is hard to justify why jurisdictional variation should exist when
considering the right to defend one's home from attack. But, since North
Carolina has a castle doctrine, it should accurately portray the traditional'
English understanding.
II. NORTH CAROLINA CASTLE DOCTRINE
The North Carolina General Assembly reconstructed its castle doctrine
statutes in 2011.42 Since this amendment, courts across the state have,
struggled with applying the law to benefit defendants as it seems the
legislature intended because the distinct lines separating the two
self-defense statutes have been blurred.
That is not to say that the changes are unwarranted, as there was an
actual need for clarification and modification. Prior to the changes, the law
allowed a person to use deadly force to prevent or terminate an unlawful,
forcible entry by an intruder into the home if the person reasonably believed

39. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 3
287 n.5 (Thomas
Cooley ed., 2d ed. rev. 1872)).
40. See id.
41. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 888 n.32 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
W[LLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 287,

42. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT.

§

14-51.1 (repealed 2011), with N.C. GEN. STAT.

§§

14-51.2 to -51.3 (2019).
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The law provided as

(a) A lawful occupant within a home or other place of residence is justified
in using any degree of force that the occupant reasonably believes is
necessary, including deadly force, against an intruder to prevent a forcible
entry into the home or residence or to terminate the intruder's unlawful
entry (i) if the occupant reasonably apprehends that the intruder may kill or
inflict serious bodily harm to the occupant or others in the home or
residence, or (ii) if the occupant reasonably believes that the intruder intends
to commit a felony in the home or residence.
(b) A lawful occupant within a home or other place of residence does not
have a duty to retreat from an intruder in the circumstances described in this
section.
(c) This section is not intended to repeal, expand, or limit any other defense
that may exist under the common law.44

Thus, a defendant who argued defensive force in the home as an
affirmative defense to a criminal homicide charge, prior to 2011, needed to
show: (1) the intruder unlawfully and forcibly entered the home, and (2) the
defendant reasonably believed that the intruder intended to kill or inflict
serious bodily harm on someone in the home or commit a felony.4 5
On June 23, 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly passed North
Carolina House Bill 650 to change the law surrounding defensive force in
the home. 46 The statutes encompassing the castle doctrine are North
Carolina General Statutes sections 14-51.2 and 14-51.3. Section 14-51.3
sets out the two situations in which a person is justified in using force. 47
The bulk of the substantive law is laid out in section 14-51.2.
Section 14-51.2 begins by listing the areas where a person is presumed
to have reasonably feared imminent death or serious bodily injury: in the

43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.1 (repealed 2011); see State v. Kuhns, 817 S.E.2d 828,
830-31 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) ("The common-law rule limiting the defense of habitation to
circumstances where the defendant was acting to prevent forcible entry into the home was

eliminated in 1993, when our General Assembly enacted N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-51.1 .... [which] 'broadened the defense of habitation to make the use of deadly force
justifiable whether to prevent unlawful entry into the home or to terminate an unlawful entry
by an intruder."') (citations omitted); see also Rubin, supra note 17.

44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.1 (repealed 2011).
45. Id.

46. H.B. 650, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 268.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.3(a) (2019) ("[A] person is justified in the use of deadly
force and does not have a duty to retreat ... . [u]nder the circumstances permitted pursuant

to G.S. 14-51.2.").
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home, in a motor vehicle, or at the workplace.4 8 When in any of these three
places, two factual circumstances must also be present for the presumption
to apply. First, the entrant "against whom" the lawful occupant of a
protected place is using defensive force against must have unlawfully and
forcefully entered, or be in the process of unlawfully and forcefully
entering, the premises. 49 Second, the lawful occupant using the defensive
force must have known or had reason to believe that the entry or attempted
entry was unlawful and forcible. 50 But even if both circumstances are
5 1
present and the presumption is applied, the law deems it "rebuttable."
Furthermore, the law provides that when a person unlawfully and
forcefully enters one of the protected spaces above the intruder is presumed
to be acting with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or
violence.52 Thus, the lawful occupant of the protected space is "immune
53
from civil or criminal liability" when responding with violent force.
Finally, the statute provides that a person does not have a duty to retreat
54
from "an intruder in the circumstances described in this section."
At first glance, it seems as if the changes provide that a person is
justified in using deadly force within the home, and does not have a duty to
55
retreat, as long as the circumstances under section 14-51.2 are present.
The new law continues to require an unlawful, forcible entry, but now
allows a person to prevent the entry of an intruder or to stop an intruder that

48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(b) ("The lawful occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or
workplace is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily,
harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodily harm to another if both of the following apply .... ").

49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(b)(1) ("The person against whom the defensive force
was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and
forcibly entered, a home, motor vehicle, or workplace .... ").

50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(b)(2) ("The person who uses defensive force knew or
had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was
occurring or had occurred.").

51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(c) ("The presumption set forth in subsection (b) of this
section shall be rebuttable .... ").
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(d) ("A person who unlawfully and by force enters or
attempts to enter a person's home, motor vehicle, or workplace is presumed to be doing so
with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence . .. ).

53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(e) ("A person who uses force as permitted by this section
is justified in using such force and is immune from civil or criminal liability for the use of
such force.").
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(f) ("A lawful occupant within his or her home, motor
vehicle, or workplace does not have a duty to retreat from an intruder in the circumstances

described in this section.").
55. N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 14-51.3(a)(2).
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has already entered.56 This change clarified that a person still has the right
to use defensive force once an intruder was actually inside the home, as
opposed to being in the process of entering the home.5 7 Moreover, the entry
is not limited to the home; section 14-51.2 also covers a person's right to
use self-defense while in a motor vehicle or at the workplace. 58
The major change, however, was that when both requirements of
section 14-51.2(b) were met, the defendant's reasonable fear of imminent
death or serious bodily harm would be presumed, thus justifying the
defendant's use of deadly force. 59 Adding a presumption of reasonable fear
would, in theory, afford a person more protection in the home. Instead of
needing reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm, a defendant would
be justified in using deadly defensive force in the home so long as the
intruder had entered or was entering the premises unlawfully or forcibly,
and the defendant subjectively believed that the unlawful or forcible entry
was occurring or had already occurred.60
This theoretical approach is in line with the traditional common law
understanding of the doctrine.6 1 The two prongs of section 14-51.2(b)
require the same elements that the English common law required: (1) a
break-in by someone intending to commit a crime and (2) knowledge of the
break-in by the person using defensive force. 62
In practice, however, prosecutors have used evidence tending to show
a defendant's lack of reasonable fear to rebut the presumption, instead of
attacking the two prongs of section 14-51.2(b), as should be the case.
Because the introductory language in section 14-51.2(c) states that "[t]he
presumption set forth in subsection (b) of this section shall be rebuttable," 63
prosecutors are using evidence tending to show a lack of reasonable fear to
rebut the presumption-just as before the 2011 amendments. 64 Hence, it is
unclear what evidence a jury should consider in determining whether the
castle doctrine defense applies.

56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(b)(1)-(2).
57. Rubin, supra note 17.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(b)(1).

59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.3(b)(1)H2); see Beale, supra note 15, at 575.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See generally Rubin, supra note 17.
See supra Section I.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(b).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(c).

64. See State v. Cook, 802 S.E.2d 575, 578 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) ("[A] defendant who
testifies that he did not intend to shoot the attacker is not entitled to an instruction under N.C.
GEN. STAT § 14-51.2 because his own words disprove the rebuttable presumption that he was
in reasonable fear of imminent harm.").
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It is possible to interpret the statute as requiring three elements for the
justification to apply: (1) reasonable belief of imminent death or serious
bodily harm, (2) unlawful and forceful entry, and (3) actual knowledge of
or subjective belief of the unlawful or forceful entry. It is also possible that
reasonable fear is presumed when the second and third elements are met;
thus, a prosecutor must negate one of those elements to rebut the
presumption.
If all three elements are required, then the rebuttable presumption does
not establish an either-or option as the language of section 14-51.3 suggests.
Instead, the law forces defendants to meet the requirements of both
self-defense theories encompassed in section 14-51.3 in order to receive a
defense of home instruction under section 14-51.2. Thus blurring the
distinct line separating the two self-defense statutes. 65
In 2018, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated, "Neither the
common law self-defense theory nor the [North Carolina General Statute
section] 14-51.2 defense theory applies where the defendant did not hold a
66
This
reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily injury."
statement provides support that the language of section 14-51.2 does not
actually make a defendant justified to use deadly force in defense of the
home, as section 14-51.3 purports is the case. 67 With this ruling, defense
attorneys have seemingly no choice but to argue that a defendant held a
reasonable belief of death or serious bodily harm, regardless of whether the
two prongs of section 14-51.2(b) are met. If the presumption actually
applied, then the reasonableness of a defendant's belief of death or serious
bodily harm would not be considered when the intruder unlawfully and
forcefully entered the protected area and the defendant subjectively
believed that to be the case.
The legislative decision to provide a "rebuttable presumption" is called
into question when the history of the statute is examined. On June 2, 2011,
the North Carolina House of Representatives submitted a version of the bill
that encompassed sections 14-51.2 and 14-51.3.68 In that version of the bill,
section 14-51.2 made the presumption of the defendant's reasonable fear of
imminent death or serious bodily harm in using the defensive force
rebuttable only when such force occurs in a motor vehicle or at the

65. See State v. Copley, 828 S.E.2d 35, 48 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (Arrowood, J.,
dissenting) ("Distinct from the defense of habitation, the General Assembly set out the

requirements for self-defense in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.3."), rev'd, 839 S.E.2d 726 (N.C.
2020).
66. Cook, 802 S.E.2d at 578.
67. See id.
68. H.B. 650, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011).
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workplace. 69 Hence, the proposed statute omitted the rebuttable language
when considering defensive force of the home. 70 This version of the bill
suggests that the legislature at one point intended for the defense of the
home to receive special treatment within the statute itself, which is in line
with the historical understanding of the castle doctrine.
In sum, no matter how one views the current law, several issues can be
addressed to strengthen the doctrine. These issues are as follows: whether
establishing the elements of (1) a felonious entry and (2) knowledge of the
entry establish a lawful occupant's reasonable fear; and whether the
rebuttable presumption should be extended to the home. These issues can
be clearly seen by comparing North Carolina law to Florida law.
III. FLORIDA'S STAND YOUR GROUND LAW

Florida's castle doctrine has been in the spotlight on many occasions.7 1
Florida has long provided substantial protection for persons who engage in
deadly force to protect the home. In Wilson v. State, the Florida Supreme
Court stated:
[O]ne's home is the castle of defense for himself and his family, and . .. an
assault upon it with an intent to injure him, or any of them, may be met in
the same way as an assault upon himself, or any of them, and ... he may
meet the assailant at the threshold, and use the necessary force for his and
their protection against the threatened invasion and harm. 72

Florida's highest court made this statement in 1892, and it was quoted
by a Florida appellate court in November 2019, over 120 years later, in
Derossettv. State.73 The court in Derossett determined that a person's home
69. Proposed section 14-51.2(c) stated, "The presumption provided in subsection (b) of
this section shall be rebuttable if the use of defensive force occurs in a motor vehicle or a
workplace." Id.

70. Id.
71. Debbie Lord, What does Florida's 'Standyour Ground' Law Say You Can Do?,
ATLANTA J.-CON. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/national/what-does-florida-

stand-your-ground-law-say-you-can/jpSBjlmK7L7bQdSFR45EIN/ [https://perna.cc/2WB
W-GNTL].
72. Wilson v. State, 11 So. 556, 561 (1892) (citations omitted).
73. See Derossett v. State, 44 Fla. L. Weekly 2713 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); Derossett
v. State, 294 So.3d 984, 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (approving the 2019 opinion and
quashing the trial court order denying Derossett immunity). The facts of Derossett are
similar to the facts from the highly publicized Breonna Taylor case. In both cases,
plain-clothed law enforcement officers were fired on by a homeowner and proceeded to
return fire. In each case, the homeowner and another civilian were struck by an officer's
bullet. No casualties occurred in Derossett, but Breonna Taylor, who was asleep when the
shooting began, lost her life. The crux of the castle doctrine analysis in Derossettturned on
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is "his or her ultimate sanctuary," and that when attacked there, the lawful
inhabitant has "no duty to retreat, [can] stand his or her ground, and [can]
use such force, even deadly force, as necessary to avoid death or great
bodily harm or to prevent the commission of a felony." 4
Today, Florida's castle doctrine, encompassed in sections 776.013 and
776.032 of the Florida Statutes, has been described as "a powerful legal tool
75
for any person who is accused of a crime and claiming justification."
Together, the "stand your ground" laws truly afford defendants a
presumption of reasonable fear. The laws require "prosecutor[s] to
overcome the presumption with evidence showing that the defendant's
76
fear .. . was unreasonable," not the other way around.
Notably, the language in the Florida statutes is not all that different
from the North Carolina statutes. In section 776.013, the Florida statute
likewise provides that lawful occupants have no duty to retreat, but limits
the locations in which it applies to when a person is lawfully in a "dwelling
or residence." 7 7 Similar to North Carolina, Florida then highlights the need
for a reasonable belief that the use of defensive force will prevent death or
great bodily harm or will "prevent the imminent commission of a forcible
felony." 78 Next, the Florida statute provides the familiar presumption of
79
reasonable fear; however, it makes no mention of it being rebuttable.
Finally, the Florida law lays out the same requirements for the presumption
to apply: if the intruder "was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully"
entering the place where the person using defensive force was lawfully

the law enforcement exception, which the court concluded did not apply since Derossett did
not know, nor should he have known, that the men who opened fire on him were in fact law
enforcement. Based on the similarities between the two cases, the law enforcement
exception should not apply in the Taylor case.

74. Derossett, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at 2713 (citing Falco v. State, 407 So. 2d 203, 208 (Fla.
1981); Danford v. State, 43 So. 593, 596-97 (1907)).
75. David S. Katz, The Castle Doctrine in Florida, KATZ & PHILLIPS, P.A.: FIREARM
FIRM BLOG (Dec. 25,

2018), https://thefirearmfirm.com/the-castle-doctrine-in-florida/

[https://perma.cc/UU6Y-H4UJ].
76. Id.
77. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1) (2015 & Supp. 2020) ("A person who is in a dwelling or
residence in which the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to
stand his or her ground .... ").

78. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(b) (stating a person may use "[d]eadly force if he or she
reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the
imminent commission of a forcible felony").

79. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(2) ("A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of
imminent peril of death or great bodily harm .... ").
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entitled to be, and the person using defensive force "knew or had reason to
believe" that the entry was "unlawful and forcible."8 0
When comparing North Carolina's and Florida's laws, one may notice
many similarities, but there is at least one notable difference: Florida's law
provides that a person "has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his
or her ground." 8' This expressly indicates what is implied in North
Carolina's version of the law-that when in a dwelling or residence, a
person has the unequivocal right to defend her home. North Carolina
provides the same "no duty to retreat" language, but its statutes do not
include the "stand his or her ground" language. 8 2
Furthermore, Florida's law effectuates the traditional understanding of
the castle doctrine by providing that section 776.013 is a justification for
the use of deadly force that will immunize a defendant who acted in
compliance with the statute. 83 Section 776.032 states that "[a] person who
uses or threatens to use force as permitted in . .. [section] 776.013 . . . is
justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution."84
" [C]riminal prosecution' includes arresting, detaining in custody, and
charging or prosecuting the defendant." 85 This immunity language is
significant because it actually encompasses the common law understanding
of the defense-instead of needing to be excused for the defense of
habitation, the legal justification of the doctrine is created. In theory, a
person that can show he was reacting to an unlawful intrusion in his home
when he killed the intruder should not be arrested or charged with murder
unless the police can find evidence that the person was not actually reacting
to such an intrusion. North Carolina's statutes include this language, but a
review of the recent court of appeals' decisions applying the castle doctrine
do not reveal any effort taken at or before trial to determine if a defendant
is justified under North Carolina General Statutes section 14-51.2.86
Additionally, Florida law provides for a pretrial immunity hearing to
determine if the section 776.012 defense applies. 87 In Florida practice,
80.
81.
82.
motor

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 776.013(2)(a)-{b).
§ 776.013(1).

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(f) (2019) ("A lawful occupant within his or her home,
vehicle, or workplace does not have a duty to retreat from an intruder in the

circumstances described in this section.").
83. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1), (4) (2017 & Supp. 2020).
84. FLA. STAT.

§

776.032(1).

85. Id.
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2 (2019).
87. FLA. STAT. § 776.032(4) (2017 & Supp. 2020) ("In a criminal prosecution, once a
prima facie claim of self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution has been raised by the
defendant at a pretrial immunity hearing, the burden of proof by clear and convincing
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when a defendant raises the defense of habitation under section 776.012, the
parties must determine whether the defense applies at a pretrial immunity,
or "Stand Your Ground," hearing. 8 At this hearing, the defendant's burden
is "simply to raise a primafacie claim of self-defense immunity."8 9 The
State bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the defendant is not entitled to immunity from further prosecution. 90 Thus,
a defendant is given a significant amount of protection after showing that
he was in his home and knew or had reason to know of the intrusion upon
his home. Once these two prongs are met, and the prima facie case is
established, the State carries the remaining burden to show why the
defendant was not justified in using deadly force. 91

IV. REFORMING NORTH CAROLINA'S LAW
North Carolina now has several options moving forward, but only two
logically flow from the discussion above. First, the legislature could
incorporate the language found in the original draft of the law, or second,
the state could adopt a pretrial immunity hearing like the one offered in
Florida.
A. Return to the Language Found in the June 2, 2011, Version of House

Bill 650
The first option is for the General Assembly to revert to the language
found in the June 2, 2011, version of the bill and establish the home as a
place where the defendant's presumption of reasonable fear of death or
serious bodily harm is not rebuttable. 92 This modification would provide
defendants with the ability to assert the castle doctrine defense under section

evidence is on the party seeking to overcome the immunity from criminal prosecution

provided in subsection (1).").
88. See Derossett v. State, 44 Fla. L. Weekly 2713, 2721 (Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
89. Id. ("Derossett's sole burden at the pretrial immunity hearing was simply to raise a
prima facie claim of self-defense immunity. The Second District Court has recently
explained that, under this statute, a prima facie claim of immunity is 'an assertion that, at
first glance, is sufficient to establish a fact or right but is yet to be disproved or rebutted by
someone[]' .... In other words, Derossett was not required to prove his immunity claim at
the Stand Your Ground hearing." (citations omitted)).

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. H.B. 650, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011).
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14-51.2, without concern for satisfying reasonable fear under section
14-51.3.93
Adopting this approach would require amending the current statutes,
something that always seems simpler in theory than in practice, but this
would be a very direct solution. This does assume, however, that the
legislature wants to establish the home as a place that receives special
protections over other places where a person is lawfully entitled to be. As
explained above, this makes sense if the legislature wants to enact a true
castle doctrine. Since a person's home is his or her castle, it is almost
improper to call current section 14-51.2 a castle doctrine. Instead, the
legislature has enacted a "lawful place to be" doctrine. Rather than
elevating the other places a person has a lawful right to be to receive equal
treatment as the home, the protections a person is afforded in the home have
been reduced to the same protections one receives in a motor vehicle or at
the workplace. A legislative amendment reverting section 14-51.2 back to
the June 2, 2011, version would return the home to its traditional level of
importance. 94
Some legislators have already proposed bills to repeal and replace
sections 14-51.2 and 14-51.3. In 2017, Representatives Harrison and Insko
proposed a bill that would entirely repeal the 2011 legislation and replace it
with the common law "use of force against an intruder."95 As amended, the
statute would be simpler than the current laws, but would require reasonable
belief of either (1) death or serious bodily injury, or (2) that the intruder
intended to commit a felony in the home, for the defendant to be justified in
using deadly force. 96 Therefore, defense of habitation would be similar to
the general understanding of self-defense, only with the added protection
for reasonable belief of the commission of a felony. The 2017 bill supports
the idea that the current law is not entirely appropriate, but it does not go as
far as House Bill 650 went in providing enhanced protection in the home.
93. This is not to say that a defendant should have to choose between making a
self-defense argument based on only one of the two sections. As is the practice in many
self-defense cases, the defendant should have the ability to argue the applicability of both
options contained in section 14-51.3 and be afforded protection by whichever prong is met.

See, e.g., State v. Coley, 822 S.E.2d 762, 764 (2018) (showing that the defense requested
jury instructions on both self-defense and defense of habitation).

94. Instead of section 14-51.2(c) stating, "The presumption set forth in subsection (b) of
this section shall be rebuttable," the reformed law would read: "The presumption provided
in subsection (b) of this section shall be rebuttable if the use of defensive force occurs in a
motor vehicle or a workplace." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(c) (2019). This would set
the home out as a place that receives greater protections, and the statute would thus be a true

castle doctrine.
95. H.B. 723, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017)
96. Id.
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The above solution may create concern that people would unjustifiably
resort to deadly force and still receive the statutory protection. This
concern, however, is already addressed under current North Carolina law.
If an intruder ceases all efforts to unlawfully and forcefully enter and exits
the premises, then the use of deadly force against the intruder is not
justified.97
B. Adopt a PretrialImmunity Hearing Similar to the FloridaStand Your
GroundProceedings
The second option that flows from the discussion above is to adopt a
98
procedure similar to the immunity hearing provided in Florida. In such a
proposed hearing, a defendant in North Carolina would need to only make
a prima facie case of the castle doctrine defense to receive the presumption
of a justified use of deadly force. The defendant would need to show two
things by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the intruder was in the
process of entering or had already unlawfully and forcefully entered the
defendant's home, and (2) that the defendant knew or had reason to believe
99
that the unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred. Upon
making such a showing, the defendant would meet the prima facie case of
the castle doctrine defense. The State could rebut the presumption by
showing that at least one of the two elements of the prima facie case were
not actually present. The State's burden would be to show this by clear and
convincing evidence. The court would not consider evidence of reasonable
fear at this hearing because the outcome of the hearing would establish the
presence or absence of reasonable fear.
It is possible that a pretrial immunity hearing could negatively affect
judicial economy; however, having such a hearing would provide several
positive outcomes. First, the reasonable belief portion of the current law
would be entirely ignored at the hearing, which comports with the statute's
intent as it is written. Therefore, a pretrial immunity hearing would better
effectuate the legislature's intent. Second, the traditional aim of the castle
doctrine would be realized-defendants who truly acted in defense of their
home would be justified in their actions and not subject to a formal trial.
Furthermore, a pretrial immunity hearing could enhance judicial
economy. A judge could dispose of cases where no reasonable jury could
find that the castle doctrine was inapplicable at the pretrial hearing stage,

97. N.C. GEN. STAT.

98.

FLA.

§

14-51.2(c)(5) (2019).

STAT. § 776.032(4) (2017 & Supp. 2020) (providing the process for

adjudicating a pretrial immunity hearing under the state's stand your ground laws).

99. N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 14-51.2(b).
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and cases where the evidence is not as clear would proceed to trial as usual.
Since cases in which a person was surely justified in using deadly force to
defend the home would be dismissed after the hearing, no jury would have
to be impaneled, the possibility of an extended trial would be quashed at the
outset, and the state's resources would be saved.
CONCLUSION

The right of self-defense has long been recognized at common law and
in North Carolina's criminal jurisprudence.
The castle doctrine,
historically, has enhanced that protection for people who need to protect
their home from unlawful intrusion. Although in many jurisdictions the
castle doctrine provides that defendants have a right to use deadly force
against intrusions in places other than the home, the traditional view of the
home as a castle should elevate the protections one receives in a home above
all other places.100 The doctrine's presence in North Carolina is a promising
start, but enacting the changes as suggested above will give genuine effect
to the traditional understanding of justified defense of habitation.
Lawrence D. Graham, Jr.*

100. See supra Section I.
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